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Introduction 
On January 1, 1999, fifteen independent nation-states of Europe are set to relinquish their national 
currencies in favor of a single European monetary unit, called the euro. While the origins of the European 
Union (EU) (formerly referred to as the European Community) date back to the Marshall Plan, the 
inception of the euro occurred in February of 1992 with the passage of the Treaty on European Union, or 
Maastricht Treaty. 1 Though the prospect ofa European Monetary Union (EMU) has attracted many 
observers from the economics, finance, and business communities, the history of the EU, and its current 
plan to adopt a single currency, is well worth the attention of everyone. 
A single European currency will make the EU - which overpowers the US in both production and 
population - more competitive by: reducing the transactions costs of exchanging currencies, allocating 
resources more efficiently through the elimination of exchange rate risk and maintaining a more stable price 
level (Eichengreen 1992: 4). Hence, the EU threatens the US' s dominance as a \vorld economic power. 
Nonetheless, with less than one year to go before the scheduled start date of the European 
Monetary Union, questions remain on whether or not the 15 member economies are sufficiently similar to 
warrant a single currency between them. Indeed, an examination of data on each of the 15 member states 
suggests that the transition to a single currency will be difficult for some and nearly impossible for others. 
This finding is particularly disconcerting in light of the potential destabilizing effects that failure of the 
EMU can have on European as well as other economies. Thus, the nation-states of Europe must proceed 
with caution. 
The EMU and the US: The Costs of Ignorance 
To economists, the prospect of a European Monetary Union is nothing short of remarkable. The 
notion that fifteen independent nation-states of Europe are about to (willingly!) dissolve their national 
currencies and adopt a single monetary unit of exchange, is difficult for most of us to fathom. While 
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economists are obsessing over such matters for obvious reasons, why anyone else, particularly Americans, 
should care about the EMU is not immediately clear. Nonetheless, the answer is simple. 
If a united Europe is to pose a threat to the US, it will come in the form of economic competition. 
While the individual nations of Europe are not very large relative to the United States - Germany is the 
largest at just under 30% of US GDP - the Union as a whole out-produces the US in any given year. As 
seen from table 1, as of 1992, the output of the European Union had grown to 109% of the US economy 
(column (2)). In terms of population, the EU is nearly one and a halftimes larger than the US, with 371 
million inhabitants (column (3)). In addition, the European economy is highly concentrated, with four 
nations - Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom - comprising 73% of total production within the 
Union (column (1)). Indeed, even if the EMU were to be comprised of only Germany, France and Italy 
upon its inception, as some observers predict will be the case, the value of its output will be equivalent to 
65% of that of the US. 
But, the European Union is already large, so why the fuss about the adoption of a single currency 
in 1999? While it is true that the European Union is not going to expand suddenly on January 1, it has the 
potential to become increasingly more competitive because of the benefits associated with monetary union. 
Indeed, the adoption ofa single medium of exchange (currency) enhances competitiveness in three 
ways. First, transactions costs are reduced by eliminating national currencies. In particular, since 
exchange rates between the European currencies no longer exist, the costs associated with the changing of 
monies disappears. In addition to freeing tourists of the commission costs associated with currency 
exchanges, European corporations and investors experience reductions in the costs of doing business in 
other (European) countries. Second, resources are allocated more efficiently through the elimination of 
exchange rate risk. Exchange rate uncertainties can cause a firm to limit its investments to domestic 
resources, even if foreign resources are more efficient, for fear that foreign currency devaluations will erode 
its profits. Hence, in the absence of exchange rates, European resources will be used more efficiently. 
4 
Third, govenunents participating in a monetary union are more likely to commit to a policy of price 
stability (Eichengreen 1992: 4). Hence, the damaging effects of inflation and disinflation are eliminated as 
well. 
Consequently, the EU's adoption of a single currency will increase the economic efficiency of the 
Union, thus, transforming it into a formidable economic foe. Even if these efficiency gains are not enough 
to threaten the dominance of the US in the world economy, the EU and the proposed EMU are clearly 
issues which merit our attention (Eichengreen 1992: 56). 
The Path to Monetary Union: The Evolution of the European Union 
The origins of the European Union date back to the Marshall Plan - a US initiative consisting of 
approximately $13 billion of financial assistance (grants and loans) designed to revive war-tom Western 
Europe (Bordo and Eichengreen 1993: 41). To oversee the plan's implementation, the Organization for 
European and Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was established in 1948. The OEEC was the first postwar 
cooperative agreement between the nation-states of Europe and the first step in a series of initiatives 
designed to unify the continent. 
Although contemporary debates on European unification typically focus on the economic costs or 
benefits of this plan, issues pertaining to international security and stability took precedence during its 
formation. Post war hostilities between Germany and France prompted policy makers to develop 
cooperative agreements between the European nation-states that effectively linked the economic welfare of 
the Union to each members' domestic policies (Baun 1996: 11). This economic interdependency among the 
nation-states insured political stability. 
Indeed, the original 'blue print' for a European Union - the 1951 Treaty of Paris that established a 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) among six Western European nations (Belgium, 
Luxembourg, France, Italy, The Netherlands, and West Germany) - was designed to mitigate hostilities 
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between its members. The Treaty did this by calling for each nation to relinquish control of its coal and 
steel industries to a supranational authority (Baun 1996: 12). Since these industries were considered key to 
the execution of a war, subjecting them to the will of a supranational organization negated the possibility of 
belligerent activity within the region. In addition, by fostering cooperation among the six countries, the 
industrial might of Western Europe was strengthened (to protect against the impending Soviet threat) 
without tipping the balance of power in favor of any particular member state. 
In the latter half of the 1950's the move toward expanded economic cooperation among the six 
nation-states gained greater momentum. In particular, the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957, establishing 
the European Economic Community (EEC), a common market which allowed member states to: trade 
goods without tariffs or quotas, abolish restrictions on the provision of financial and professional services 
between nations, allow for the free flow of resources (such as labor, capital and entrepreneurship) across 
national boundaries, and ban discrimination based on nationality (Swann 1992: 7). Within two decades, 
the six members of the European Economic Community expanded to twelve with the additions of Denmark, 
the Irish Republic and the United Kingdom in 1973, Greece in 1981, and Spain and Portugal in 1986 
(Swann 1992: 10). Currently, membership stands at 15 with the admittance of Austria, Finland and 
Sweden in 1995. 
Despite the rather comprehensive provisions in the Treaty of Rome, the agreement did not envisage 
monetary unification (a common currency) for the European Community; this issue was not addressed 
until late 1989. Hence, while the EEC removed restrictions on capital mobility within the Community, 
investors continued to face the possibility of exchange rate volatility. The fear of a currency devaluation 
curbed investors' willingness to purchase foreign capital. Consequently, members agreed to an Exchange 
Rate Mechanism (ERM) whereby each nation 'pegged' its exchange rate within a specified range or band 
of every other member's currency .2 Instituted in March of 1979, this agreement marked the inauguration of 
the European Monetary System (EMS), a first step in the process of currency unification (Tew 1992: 197). 
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While the intent of the ERM was to achieve exchange rate stability, the system suffered two 
serious breakdowns in the summers of 1992 and 1993. In essence, heavy speculation on primarily the 
French franc, the Italian lira and the British pound made it impossible for members to keep their exchange 
rates within the bands specified by the ERM ( Corden 1994: 113). In both cases, members either devalued 
their currencies, lobbied to have the EMS widen the bands, or withdrew from the mechanism altogether.3 
The Pitfalls of Monetary Union: The Economics of a Fixed Exchange Rate System 
The ERM experiment revealed a critical flaw inherent in a pegged or fixed exchange rate system. 
As a single European currency represents the purest, and most austere, form of a fixed exchange rate 
system, it is crucial that EU policy makers inoculate the EMU from this flaw. In particular, a fixed 
exchange rate regime fetters each nation's monetary policy to the objective of maintaining a specified 
exchange value for its currency, making it difficult to implement policy that is solely in the interest of the 
domestic economy. For example, since policy makers are unable to expand the economy and support the 
foreign exchange value of the nation's currency simultaneously, adherence to an exchange rate regime 
requires that the former be sacrificed in favor of the latter. Of course, eventually domestic (political) 
pressures take precedence, forcing policy makers to abandon their adherence to these seemingly arbitrary 
international agreements. A nation signals its disassociation with the exchange rate regime by ceasing to 
support the value of its currency. Only then is the nation able to pursue monetary and fiscal policies in the 
interest of its own economy. 
So, while exchange rate risk is completely removed in the presence of a single monetary unit, and 
hence capital mobility is enhanced, discretionary monetary policy within each nation becomes impossible. 
Moreover, it is difficult for any member to simply drop out of such an agreement since, presumably, there 
is no longer a home currency for which to revert. Hence, if a group of nations is to adopt a single monetary 
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unit, measures must be taken to ensure that pressures capable of disrupting the system never surface. The 
1992 Treaty on European Union (the Maastricht Treaty) was designed with such measures in mind. 
The Conception of the Euro: The Delors Report and the Economics of Convergence 
In June of 1988 the European Council established a committee, headed by the President of the EU 
commission, Jacques Delors, to investigate the possibility of replacing the, then, twelve currencies of the 
European Community with a single European Monetary Unit (EMU) (Tew 1994: 202)4. The resulting 
Delors Report recommended that the EC adopt such a currency in three stages - the plan was essentially 
embraced in full by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 (Carden 1994: 152). 
Starting in July of 1990, all members of the Union would begin to work toward economic 
'convergence.' Next, monetary policy would be transferred from each nation's central bank to that of a 
European Central Bank (ECB). Then, exchange rates would be 'irrevocably' locked between member 
nations just prior to the phasing in of a single currency. In addition, budgetary constraints would be 
imposed on all members, limiting the size of each nation's deficit and debt (Tew 1994: 203). 
Achieving economic convergence is by far the most crucial step in the process toward monetary 
unification. Since a common currency will require a common monetary policy, each nation will be forced 
to relinquish control of its monetary authority ( central bank), and monetary policy will fall into the hands of 
the proposed European Central Bank (ECB); the ECB will be immune from political pressures, committed 
solely to the objective of maintaining price stability in the Union (Carden 1994: 152). With the ECB 
focused on managing the performance of the entire EU economy, it will be unable to pursue discretionary 
policies specific to a particular nation's economic circumstances. That is, the adoption of a single currency 
will effectively tie the hands of each nation's policy makers, rendering their economies defenseless to 
shocks. So, in order for the ECB's monetary policy to satisfy every member of the Union, all economies 
within the Union must 'converge' so that each expands and contracts simultaneously, and at similar speeds. 
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For example, if Spain is growing more slowly than Finland, a tight monetary policy will be 
appropriate for the Finnish economy, but harsh on the Spanish economy. Likewise, a loose monetary 
policy that seeks to encourage growth in Portugal, can cause inflation in Germany. In summary, since the 
ECB will be unable to direct its monetary policy to one region of the EU without affecting the economies of 
the other regions, the economies must be synchronized so that region-specific problems simply do not arise. 
For this reason, the Maastricht Treaty requires that members' economies sufficiently 'converge' prior to 
their joining the Union. 
The Maastricht Treaty: The Rules of the Game 
The implementation of the Delors Report came to fruition in February of 1992 with the passage of 
the Treaty on European Union, or Maastricht Treaty (Holden 1992: 9). While this agreement contains 
many provisions, including preserving fundamental freedoms, promoting democracy and protecting the 
environment, the key economic initiative is "to achieve economic convergence and union and a single stable 
currency;" this single currency has come to be known as the euro, set to take effect on January 1 of 1999 
(Holden 1992: 12). 
The agreement specifies the following set of five criteria to which member states' economies must 
adhere in order to gain acceptance into the EMU by the 1999 start date: 1. price stability, defined as a rate 
of inflation within 1.5 percentage points of the three best performing EU countries; 2. low long term 
interest rates, defined as within two percentage points of the three lowest scoring EU countries; 3. 
exchange rate stability, meaning that for at least two years the country concerned has kept with the normal 
fluctuation margins of Europe's exchange rate mechanism; 4. a sustainable government financial position, 
defined in two ways: a budget deficit no higher than 3% of GDP; and, a ratio of public debt to GDP ofno 
more than 60% (Economist 1997: 7). 
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With less than one year to go before the scheduled start date of the European Monetary Union, the 
critical issue centers on whether or not the 15 member economies are sufficiently similar to warrant a single 
currency between them. In the next section, we approach this question by examining data on the European 
Union pertaining to the convergence criteria stipulated in the Maastricht Treaty. 
The Prospects for Convergence: A Look at the Data 
In this section, we look at the behavior of output, inflation, exchange rates, interest rates and 
government finance for each of the 15 member states, for the period from 1972 (the end of the Bretton 
Woods exchange rate regime) to 1996 - all data are annual. While we can not predict success or failure in 
1999, the follmving cursory analysis of the data provides us with some insight as to the feasibility of 
implementing the euro. 
Growth in Real GDP. Table 2 lists the average rates of growth for each member between 1972 
and 1996. These figures, which one can interpret as the long run growth of each economy, are a useful 
indicator of the level of convergence within the European Union. If the Union's economies have 
sufficiently converged, one should observe similar rates of gro\\th for each of the member states. 
According to table 2, in the last 24 years, the fastest growing country among the fifteen members, Ireland, 
experienced an average rate of grov,th of more than twice that of the weakest economy, Sweden. Divergent 
as this may seem, it must be noted that these two members account for only O. 7% and 2. 9% of all the 
production in the European Union, respectively. Moreover, given the relatively small (undeveloped) base 
from which the Irish economy has grown, Ireland is most appropriately viewed as a special case.5 
Nonetheless, evidence of divergence is also present, albeit less so, for the larger member states. In 
particular, Germany's growth in the last 18 years has outpaced that of France, Italy and the United 
Kingdom by as much as 125% - 150%. Moreover, these differences in growth exist in the short run as 
10 
well. Namely, an examination of average growth rates within the last six years suggests that Germany 
continues to outpace the other large Union members by 160% to 260%. 6 
Growth in the Price Level. Table 2 also lists the average rates of inflation (as measured by the 
change in consumer prices) for each member country. Over the long run, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain 
have suffered with double digit inflation, while price levels in Austria, Germany and the Netherlands have 
remained under control; of the remaining large economies, France and the United Kingdom have had 
relatively high, albeit not excessive, rates of inflation. However, while the average rate of inflation over the 
last 24 years differs significantly between countries, only that of Greece remains disturbingly high today. 
As shown in figure 1, the average rate of growth in the CPI for the European Union as a whole has trended 
downward since the 1980's. 
Foreign Exchange. Table 3 shows the mean and standard deviation of each currency's exchange 
value relative to Germany's deutsche mark for two periods. 7 First, the entire period from 1972 to 1996 is 
considered, then, to gain some insight into the current situation, we examine 1990 to 1996. In general, the 
Southern European economies have had the greatest difficulty quelling long run exchange rate volatility, 
with (Greece's) drachmas exhibiting the greatest variability of all currencies. Nonetheless, exchange rate 
volatility has decreased considerably in the last decade. As the second plate of table 3 shows, in the last 
seven years, deviations from the mean have decreased for almost every currency. Only Greece and Italy 
continue to have difficulty with this criterion. 
Long-Term Interest Rates. Overall, long-term interest rates within the Union have remained 
relatively low and stable over the last 24 years. Presently, interest rate stability is not a problem for any of 
the member nations (Economist 1997: 7). 
Deficit to GDP and Debt to GDP. As table 4 illustrates, four EU members have maintained 
deficit to GDP ratios under the Maastricht specified 3% in the last 24 years. 8 However, three of the 
members have experienced ratios in excess of 3 times the Maastricht specification. In terms of debt to 
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GDP ratios, Belgium and Italy appear to be in greatest violation of the 50% ceiling. Meanwhile, three of 
the largest members, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, should have little difficulty meeting this 
criterion. In any case, the survival of the euro is not integrally dependent upon the Union's adherence to 
these two ratios, and hence it is possible that Union members will overlook violations in this area. 
In summary, while inflation and interest rate volatility do not pose a problem for any of the 
members, divergent grmvth rates, exchange rate volatility and fiscal instability suggest that some member 
states will have difficulty gaining entrance into the proposed monetary union. Moreover, if all fifteen 
members do join, the universal monetary policy of the European Central Bank could prove to be 
disproportionately harsh on those weaker economies. That is, these economies may require a monetary 
policy that is more expansionary than that which the Union as a whole is willing to tolerate; pressures such 
as these could contribute to the demise of the EMU. 
The notion that the EMU could collapse is disconcerting as well as destabilizing in two respects. 
First, should the euro fail before being implemented, investors may abandon European currencies as 
expectations regarding the future strength of the Union dissolve. The uncertainty caused by this event 
would hamper investment within the Union as well as increase the value of the dollar relative to EU 
currencies. The former would diminish the gmwth of the EU while the latter would hurt the US as exports 
to Europe decreased and imports from Europe increased. Second, if the euro were to fail after Union 
members relinquished their national currencies, the value of the euro would depreciate as nations attempted 
to re-introduce their national currencies. This case would be particularly destabilizing for Europe as newly 
issued (but abandoned) euros co-existed with re-issued member currencies. A period of uncertainty, 
coupled with investor speculation would most likely result in an international collapse of confidence in the 
European Union. 
12 
Conclusion 
According to the Maastricht Treaty, on January 1, 1999, fifteen independent currencies of Europe 
will be dissolved in favor of the euro, a single European currency unit. But, with less than one year to go 
before the scheduled start date, few nations have sufficiently satisfied Maastricht's convergence criteria. 
Indeed, an examination of 'convergence' data on each of the 15 member states suggested that the transition 
to a single currency will be difficult for some members and nearly impossible for others. While inflation 
and interest rate volatility do not pose a problem for any of the members, divergent growth rates, exchange 
rate volatility and fiscal instability suggest that some member states will have difficulty gaining entrance 
into the proposed monetary union. 
This finding is disturbing given the potentially destabilizing effects that failure of the EMU could 
have on European as well as other economies. Failure of the euro could cause uncertainty in the EU, thus 
hampering investment within the Union as well as hurting US exports. Moreover, failure of the euro after 
Union members relinquish their national currencies would cause chaos in the foreign exchange markets as 
nations attempted to abandon the euro and re-introduce their national currencies. An international collapse 
of confidence in the European Union would most likely result. 
If the EMU succeeds, cost reductions and efficiency gains are certain to make the EU more 
competitive. Therefore, that the US prepare to compete with a larger, more streamlined Europe is crucial. 
In either case, the changes taking place in the European Union are monumental, and hence warrant the 
attention of all nations, particularly the US. 
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Table 1: Comparative Summary Statistics: European Union Members and the United States, 1992-1994.· 
Country (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Share of GDP Share of GDP Population Population Population 
Relative to EU Relative to US (in millions) Share Relative Share Relative 
to EU to US 
Austria 2.6% 2.8% 8.0 2.2% 3.1% 
Belgium 3.2% 3.5% 10.1 2.7% 3.9% 
Denmark 2.0% 2.2% 5.2 1.4% 2.0% 
Finland 1.4% 1.5% 5.1 1.4% 2.0% 
France 18.9% 20.6% 57.9 15.6% 22.2% 
Germany 27.3% 29.8% 81.4 21.9% 31.2% 
Greece 1.0% 1.1% 10.4 2.8% 4.0% 
Ireland 0.7% 0.8% 3.6 1.0% 1.4% 
Italy 14.2% 15.5% 57.2 15.4% 21.9% 
Luxembourg 0.1% 0.2% 0.4 0.1% 0.2% 
Netherlands 4.7% 5.1% 15.4 4.1% 5.9% 
Portugal 1.1% 1.2% 9.9 2.7% 3.8% 
Spain 7.1% 7.7% 39.2 10.6% 15% 
Sweden 2.9% 3.2% 8.8 2.4% 3.4% 
UK 12.7% 13.9% 58.4 15.7% 22.4% 
EU 100% 109.2% 371.0 100% 142.3% 
United States 91.6% 100% 260.7 70.2% 100% 
* Data Source: Intemat10nal Financial Statistics Yearbook 1997, International Monetary Fund. GDP data are 1992; 
population data are 1994. Columns ( 1) and (2) are calculated by converting the GDP of each country into 1992 dollars and 
then dividing by GDPw in column (1) and GDPus in column (2). 
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Table 2: Mean Growth Rate in Real GDP and the Price Level: European Union Members, annual data for the 
period 1972 to 1996 • 
Mean Growth Rates 
Country (1) (2) 
Real GDP Price Level 
Austria 2.3% 4.0% 
Bel2ium 2.0% 4.8% 
Denmark l.9% 6.3% 
Finland 2.3% 7.0% 
France 2.2% 6.6% 
Germany 3.0% 3.2% 
Greece 2.2% 16.4% 
Ireland 4.0% 8.3% 
Italy 2.4% 10.2% 
Luxembour2 2.7% 4.6% 
Netherlands 2.3% 3.5% 
Portu2al 3.1% 15.5% 
Spain 2.4% 10.3% 
Sweden 1.6% 7.5% 
UK 2.0% 7.9% 
* Data Source: International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1997, International Monetary Fund. Mean growth rates are 
calculated as the coefficient on time in a regression of the natural log of each country's GDP ( or CPI) on a constant and time 
trend. Due to data constraints some sample periods are amended as follows: 1972-1995 for GDPPortugal and GDPsweden; 1972-
1994 for GDP Austria, GDPBe!gium, and GDP Greece; 1972-1992 GDPLuxembourg; 1979-1996 for GDP Germany-
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Table 3: Foreign Exchange Volatility: European Union Members, means and standard deviations of annual data 
for the periods 1972 to 1996 and 1990-1996.· 
Foreign Exchange Rate Foreign Exchange Rate 
1972-1996 1990-1996 
Country (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Mean Standard Mean Standard 
Deviation Deviation 
Austria 7.10 0.09 7.07 0.06 
Belgium 18.56 2.62 20.64 0.14 
Denmark 3.34 0.63 3.88 0.04 
Finland 2.26 0.58 2.97 0.31 
France 2.81 0.66 3.41 0.03 
Greece 65.67 53.80 139.67 22.64 
Ireland 0.31 0.08 0.40 0.02 
Italy 624.27 262.49 936.62 136.16 
Luxemboun? 18.56 2.62 20.64 0.14 
Netherlands 1.10 0.04 1.12 0.004 
Portugal 55.64 35.55 96.98 7.00 
Spain 53.78 21.11 76.60 9.70 
Sweden 3.07 1.06 4.36 0.47 
UK 0.29 0.09 0.39 0.04 
* Data Source: International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1997, International Monetary Fund. The foreign exchange means 
and standard deviations are calculated for each nation's currency against the Deutsche Mark. 
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Table 4: Debt and Deficit as a Share of GDP: European Union Members· 
Share Relative to Own Country GDP 
Country (1) (2) 
Deficit Debt 
Austria 5.6% 54.6% 
Bel2ium 4.6% 129.9% 
Denmark 2.4% n.a. 
Finland 11.5% n.a. 
France 5.6% 39.6% 
Germany 1.3% 30.2% 
Greece 21.3% n.a. 
Ireland 0.9% n.a. 
ltalv n.a. 118.3% 
Luxembour2 n.a. n.a. 
Netherlands 0.5% 61.6% 
Portu2al 5.0% n.a. 
Soain 7.8% 54.2% 
Sweden 12.7% 66.4% 
UK 5.4% 32.1% 
* Data Source: International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1997, International Monetary Fund. Data are 1994. Columns ( 1) 
and (2) are calculated by dividing own country deficit and debt in 1994 by the product of own country GDP in 1990 prices and 
the 1994 GDP deflator (1990=100). 
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Figure 1: CPI Inflation in the EU 
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I The term 'European Union' replaced 'European Community' with the passage of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. 
2 While the agreement implied that these exchange rate bands were relatively inflexible and could only be altered 
by Union-wide consensus, by the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, these bands had been altered on some twelve 
different occasions. 
3 In 1992, Spain devalued the peseta while Italy and the UK left the ERM; in 1993, currency bands were widened 
from 2.5% to 15%. 
4 The European Commission and the Council (of Ministers) were created by the Treaty of Rome in 1957. The 
former initiates and administers policy proposals for the EU. The latter is the law making body of the 
Commission, responsible for the passage of the Committee's draft directives. 
5 Thanks to Evert Van der Sluis for suggesting this interpretation of the Irish data. 
6 The average rates of gro'\\1h for the period 1990-1996 were as follows: Germany 2.6%, UK 1.6%, France 1.1% 
and Italy 1.0%. 
7 The Deutsche Mark is typically used as the benchmark currency because it is perceived to be the strongest and 
most stable of the larger European nations. 
8 Data were unavailable for Italy and Luxembourg. The former is believed to have a deficit near (but above) the 
required 3% of GDP, while the latter is in compliance (Economist 1997: 7). 
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